This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of Tarski's semantic background and to the history of metalanguage and truth. Although in his 1933 monograph Tarski credits his master, Stanisław Leśniewski, with crucial negative results on the semantics of natural language, the conceptual relationship between the two logicians has never been investigated in a thorough manner. This paper shows that it was not Tarski, but Leśniewski who first avowed the impossibility of giving a satisfactory theory of truth for ordinary language, and the necessity of sanitation of the latter for scientific purposes. In an early article (1913) Leśniewski gave an interesting solution to the Liar Paradox, which, although different from Tarski's in detail, is nevertheless important to Tarski's semantic background. To illustrate this I give an analysis of Leśniewski's solution and of some related aspects of Leśniewski's later thought.
2

Subject Code Classifications: 03A05 Philosophical and critical 03-03 Historical 01A60
History of mathematics and mathematicians -20 th century
I. A Well-entrenched Conviction
There is a well-entrenched conviction about Alfred Tarski which is shared by a large number of philosophers: it was Tarski who first showed, in his epoch-making monograph on truth, that semantical paradoxes demonstrate that natural language is hopelessly infected with contradiction, and must be sanitized before any serious talk on truth can begin. 1 The well-entrenched conviction is, however, demonstrably wrong. The idea comes from Stanisław Leśniewski, and not from Tarski, his sole doctoral student.
Although Tarski was responsible for wrong-doings towards Leśniewski, he cannot be blamed for having contributed to this particular historical distortion. When going through the negative results on natural language in the first chapter of his famous work on truth, Tarski himself explicitly credits his master with them.
The considerations which I shall put forward in this connexion <i. e. the discussion of the various difficulties which meet the attempts to solve the problem of the definition of truth in application to the ordinary language, A.B.> are, for the most part, not the result of my own studies. Views are expressed in them which have been developed by S. Leśniewski in his lectures at the University of Warsaw (from the academic year 1919/20 onwards), in scientific discussions and in private conversations; this applies, in particular, to almost everything which I shall say about expressions in quotation marks and the semantical antinomies […] . 2 PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 3 It is not Tarski's fault, thus, if the demonstration of the impossibility of a formally correct and materially adequate truth-definition for natural language, as well as the considerations concerning its semantic closure, and about the difficulties linked with quotation marks, are almost without exception attributed to him and not to Leśniewski. 3 This well-entrenched conviction is prevalent in that part of the scholarly world which is not familiar with Polish analytic philosophy, or at least not with Leśniewski. Among those philosophers who are, instead, sufficiently conversant with this philosophical territory, Tarski's words are taken at face value. But even if for some Leśniewski' s role in the first chapter of Tarski's book is not news, no one has so far provided us with much more than the disconsolate remark that we find no treatment of semantic paradoxes in Leśniewski's writings. 4 Here is the novelty: there is written evidence that Leśniewski had first the idea of sanitation, and so we need not make do with oral or third-party testimony. We do have a treatment of paradoxes by Leśniewski, only it does not belong among Leśniewski To the best of my knowledge, hardly anyone has so far noticed Leśniewski's Liar, let alone understood its importance in spelling out Tarski's semantic background. 6 As a matter of fact, generally speaking Leśniewski's influence upon Tarski is recognized, 7 but the conceptual links between them have not yet been thoroughly investigated. My main aim will be to show that such an investigation must start with Leśniewski's socalled 'prelogistic phase'. This is, however, only part of the story, and it is not meant PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 4 to dispute the fact that the most relevant influence on Tarski was exerted by Leśniewski's more mature thought.
A thorough account of the latter fact is, nevertheless, rather difficult to give, owing to the intricacies in the development of Leśniewski's ideas and the lack of textual sources. In the final sections of the present paper I attempt, however, a preliminary analysis of two aspects connected with the mature Leśniewski. My account is not exhaustive, and an open-ended epilogue is to be expected: a comprehensive reconstruction of the Leśniewskian background of Tarski's semantics would need a broader historical context in which to embed Leśniewski's and Tarski's contrasting attitudes towards logic, and it would go far beyond the scope of the present contribution.
I would like to stress, though, that however indispensable Leśniewski's contribution to Tarski's negative results regarding natural language was, I attempt in no way to diminish Tarski's positive results. In particular, as will be clearer in the following, Tarski's own solution to the Liar is quite different from Leśniewski's early one, nor does the cure he proposes for the illnesses of natural language coincide with his master's mature remedy.
II. Leśniewski's Early Semantics
Leśniewski's Liar is to be found in an early paper which Leśniewski later disowned, together with other three, as immature and very deficient. 8 If we want to avoid misunderstandings as to what the trademark 'Leśniewski' should or should not be attached to, this fact is vital to bear in mind. Although in the early writings we find PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 5 typical traits that Leśniewski maintained also later, some ideas are characteristic of this period only, and cannot be carried over to his mature thought.
The chronology of Leśniewski's writings is usually seen as falling into two main periods, with a transitional one in the middle: the early period (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) , comprising five papers, the so-called 'prelogistic' writings; the 'bridging work' of 1916 on Mereology; finally, the mature, 'logistic' writings (1927-1938) , in which Leśniewski sets out part of the architecture of the logical systems and mature formal results. Although this partition of Leśniewski's oeuvre is questionable, it is certainly adequate for my purposes here. 9 Leśniewski's early works are devoted to a critical assessment of fundamental logico-semantic and ontological principles of traditional logic. In this he was inspired by Łukasiewicz, who, in the same period, was engaged in a similar, although radically opposed, project. 10 Leśniewski's solution to the Liar in the "Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle" ('Critique' henceforth) is conceived within the framework of this general reconsideration of the classical logical heritage.
The semantic notions and the logical principles on which Leśniewski's solution is based are exposed in the following. Note that his perspective here is rather traditional in the sense of a traditional logic of terms.
1. The main aim of the Critique, to which Leśniewski's solution to the Liar is strictly connected, is to show that the logical principle of excluded middle is false. Despite this latter apparent oddity, Leśniewski is very faithful to classical and old-fashioned logical views, something which was to become also typical of his logical systems. According to Leśniewski, LTND is false, because there are pairs of contradictory sentences for which it does not hold, i. e. there are cases in which 'a is b' and 'a is not b' are both false. One may wonder how this is at all possible if we are to understand correctly the notion of contradiction considered in LTND. The truth of the matter is that here Leśniewski's 'contradiction' is in fact a weaker notion, resulting in some cases in a mere contrariety of the sentences under consideration (for which, as is wellknown in traditional logic, the excluded middle fails). This, in turn, derives from the notion of negation which Leśniewski considers, namely (predicate) term negation. In the sentence 'contradicting' 'a is b', i. e. its denial 'a is not b', negation is understood as in 'a is non-b'. 12 Leśniewski shows that LTND is false in virtue of his conditions of truth for wellformed sentences, i. e. for sentences reduced to the canonical form 'a is b': L1' a ' is a denotative name; L2' b ' is a connotative name; L3 the object(s) denoted by 'a' possess(es) the property/ies connoted by 'b'. 13 Here 'denotation' and 'connotation' are taken more or less in John Stuart Mill's sense. 14 RLTNDIf one among two sentences of the form 'a is b' and 'a is non-b' is false, the other is true iff its subject is denotative and its predicate is connotative. OTNDEvery object a has either the property b or else non-b
Note that a special case of OTND is the Principle of Bivalence, truth and falsity being properties of sentences as special objects ('non-true' equals 'false'). 15 2. The issue of the Critique directly relevant for us is the testing of Leśniewski's semantical apparatus vis-à-vis a series of famous paradoxes. Some paradoxes disappear by merely showing that the pairs of 'contradictory' sentences of which the paradox consists have an empty subject. In order to solve the Liar, however, Leśniewski is forced to introduce the following convention, as he terms such logico-semantic rules, the sole brand-new one of the Critique. It can be re-written as follows: 16 KFor every token-expression W connoting the properties b1…bn and for every object o, W denotes o iff o possesses the properties b1…bn, with the exception of the case in which o is W itself and of the case in which o is an object having any constitutive part in common with W. 17 PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 3. The following is also laid down, TLFor every a and b, 'a is b' is true iff a is b. 20 Note that TL is in no sense or circumstance taken as a definition of the predicate 'true'.
4. Leśniewski observes the use/mention distinction with scrupulous care, to a degree far beyond what was common among his contemporaries. 21 The reason for such unusual attention has been linked to the fact that Leśniewski had already by that time recognized and applied the language/metalanguage distinction. Indeed, some passages from Leśniewski's early writings suggest this line of thought, and some scholars, notably Surma and Lejewski, ascribed Leśniewski's 'discovery' of the latter, fundamental distinction to the very beginning of his activity. The whole issue depends, among other things, on whether we are ready to identify the use/mention with the language/metalanguage distinction. This matter is by no means settled, and I shall return to it later. 22 PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 
III. Leśniewski's Early Liar
Here follows Leśniewski's solution, of which I shall give only the bare bones. 23 The reason why Leśniewski offers a solution to the Liar Paradox is expressly that he wants to show that LPC and RLTND, two fundamental principles of his semantics, are not contested by the Liar and that, therefore, the semantics he has laid down is consistent.
First of all Leśniewski analyses the Paradox in a way that can be reconstructed as follows. Epimenides states at time t1 the sentence 'the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false'. Let us suppose that the sentence he states is true. 'Ep' abbreviates here below 'the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1'. 24 i.Ep is true hyp. 1
ii.'Ep is true' is trueFrom i., TL
iii.'Ep is false' is falseFrom ii., LPC (since 'Ep is true' and 'Ep is false' are mutually 'contradictory') iv.Ep = 'Ep is false'(since the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is 'the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false') v.Ep is falseFrom iii., iv., Leibniz' s Law
Leibniz's law is applied to iii. and iv. to get v., although Leśniewski does not say explicitly that here there is an instance of the law. 25 So from the hypothesis that Ep is true it follows that Ep is false, and so hyp. 1 is false, because it leads to a contradiction.
Let us suppose now that the sentence stated by Epimenides is false.
PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www. And now Leśniewski claims that RLTND and LPC are not challenged by the Epimenides paradox, because for K the subject of (*) is non-denotative. As a matter of fact, for K the expression that is the subject of the token (*), 'the sentence stated by
Epimenides at t1', as a part of (*), denotes any object that has the properties connoted PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 11 by it except itself and objects that have constitutive parts in common with it. But since the unique object that the subject of (*) could denote is (*) itself, and these two expressions have constitutive parts in common, the subject of (*) is non-denotative.
The conclusion is, therefore, that the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false. And the subject of the sentence 'The sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false' when it is stated-for instance-by me in 2002, i.e. the token (**) 'The sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false 'ab, 2003 does, instead, denote (*), and does not possess a constitutive part common with the expression stated by Epimenides, but only with the expression stated by me in 2003, namely (**). Therefore (**) is a true sentence, and, for TL '(**) is a true sentence' is a true sentence, etc. The same conclusions hold in application to any other token of 'the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false' stated by any other person at any other time, with the proviso that it is not Epimenides at t1. From the truth of (**), or of any other (from (*)) token of 'the sentence stated by Epimenides at t1 is false', follows not the truth of (*), as the Paradox claims, but the truth of sentences which are composed of the same expressions of (*), which is false.
IV. "The Natural Rapids on the Dnepr"
Much could be said concerning Leśniewski's solution, its medieval ancestors and its contemporary descendants. 28 But these angles appear to be of minor relevance to our present purpose. It is what Leśniewski says regarding K that deserves all our attention:
It is absolutely correct that I solved the paradox of Epimenides only because I accepted <K, A.B.>-had I not accepted it, the paradox would not have been solved. It is also correct to say that the above-mentioned convention is 'arbitrary' in the sense that it 12 conflicts with 'natural' 'tendencies of development' of language. These latter are undoubtedly contravened in my 'laws' by the fact that certain connoting expressions are not supposed to represent all objects which have the properties connoted by the given expressions. Such remarks, I say, would be totally justified-they could not, however, depreciate my arguments in any way. Since, keeping to 'natural tendencies of development' of language we get involved in irresolvable paradoxes, these 'tendencies' seem to imply contradiction in themselves. [...] 'scientific' language can eliminate various contradictions only departing from some schemas of 'natural language'; its value will depend on how much it succeeds in eliminating contradictions. 'Scientific'
language 'artificially' framed by exactly defined conventions is a far better instrument of reason than language dissolving in the opaque contours of 'natural' habits which often imply incurable contradictions-much as the 'artificially' regulated Panama Canal is a better waterway than the 'natural' rapids on the Dnepr. 29 There are at least three important issues to be noticed in connection with the introduction of K and with the passage just quoted.
The first regards the distinction philosophers usually describe as the token/type distinction. Without using this terminology, which he never employed, Leśniewski makes explicit the ontological status of the entities which play the role of truth- The second important element concerns the fact that natural language has a superabundance of expressive means, to the extent that only by limiting this superabundance can we solve the contradictions which we get involved in while operating with natural language, as the Epimenides paradox shows. Here, in particular, the limitation at issue regards self-reference in the sense of K.
The third important fact is connected with the second, and regards the (non-)
'naturality' of the language for which Leśniewski's solution is designed. The point is very interesting, and rather complicated, as it is also linked with Leśniewski's distinction between metalanguage and object-language, which, as previously mentioned, has not yet been discussed in the right perspective. We may first ask: does the distinction come from Leśniewski? and do we find it in his early papers? The answer to the first question is in the affirmative, as it will be clearer in the following section. Tarski's failure to ascribe the distinction properly to Leśniewski is indeed one for which he deserves to be blamed, and one of the greatest historical distortions to Leśniewski's detriment to which Tarski contributed. As a result, Tarski's, and not
Leśniewski's, name is now most intimately associated with it.
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Another question is, however, whether we find the distinction in Leśniewski's early papers. As mentioned above, Lejewski and Surma believe so. According to Czesław Lejewski, referring to Leśniewski's first paper:
Leśniewski strictly […] complied with the principle of observing the difference between object language and metalanguage or between use and mention to put it in alternative terms. 32 Surma's claim is weaker and more acceptable: the early papers contain "the first outline of the distinction between language and metalanguage". 33 It is correct to say that in his early papers Leśniewski observes scrupulously the distinction between use and mention of words (no matter whether this is the right way of putting it), but it is not for this reason that we find there the first outline of the momentous distinction between language and metalanguage. 34 To understand correctly what is at issue here, and in what way the early papers contain a move towards the distinction, one has to take into account an aspect of Leśniewski's early language about which Leśniewski himself is quite explicit, but on which misconceptions have often arisen. Leśniewski did not operate here within a fully formalized language. Nevertheless, Leśniewski's solution to the Liar is not meant for natural language. Leśniewski is well aware that in his papers he is discussing the grammar of regimented language, and it is because of this awareness that we can say that we find here the first outline of the distinction between language and metalanguage. In the language in which conventions, theses and semantic analyses are formulated, Leśniewski talks about language which he calls 'scientific language'. The scientific language is (conceived as) regimented natural language, as only language like this can be an adequate means of investigation in scientific practice.
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The artificiality of this 'scientific language' is not a negative value: only thanks to the artificial elimination of its pernicious ambiguities-dangerous like the deadly rapids on the Dnepr, in the quotation-does natural language become an adequate means for scientific argumentation. Leśniewski's solution is meant for this language made 'scientific', not for natural language. Leśniewski's language of 1911-13 is, even if not symbolic, a partially artificial language, which already comprises fragments of formalized language, and which aims to be formalized in full. In speaking of conventions, definitions, theorems, proofs, rules, and trying to free his formulations from the typical ambiguities of ordinary language, Leśniewski created at this stage something located-very much in the spirit of the medieval tradition-in the middle between ordinary and formalized language, no longer the former, not yet the latter.
Whoever wants to do justice to Leśniewski should consider first of all these two latter connected aspects as making his approach original. Only in this way can Leśniewski's influence upon the development of semantics be seen more clearly. The modern approach is characterized by the idea that paradoxes show something deep and important about language. It has been argued that the modern treatments of the Liar differ from the traditional because of the modern attitude towards paradoxes as 'crash tests', under which semantic machineries can fall into a thousand pieces. 35 In this sense the approach of the Critique seems to be the first modern approach to paradoxes. The thought that paradoxes teach us that there is 'something to give up in ordinary language' belongs today to logical folkore. Leśniewski was the first, in 1913, twenty years before Tarski, to point out that this something is its semantic richness.
This was also one of the most important reasons Tarski had to cite his teacher in the
Concept of Truth.
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V. The Early Leśniewski, Tarski and the Hierarchy of Languages
Without a doubt Leśniewski's 1913 solution has only very weak links with Tarski's own solution. It is a contextual solution, it makes use of a ban on self-reference and is based on tokens, and its direct links to the Tarskian hierarchy of languages as a way out are to be put seriously in question. The point is related to the language-versusmetalanguage distinction and to Leśniewski's non-natural regimented language as discussed above, although it remains a different point anyway. The issue is worth considering, as misunderstandings could easily arise from Leśniewski's application of TL to get a language stratification which seems to create a metalinguistic ascent. 36 As Albert Visser pointed out, 37 Tarski's definition of 'metalanguage' as "the language in which we 'talk about' [the object-language] and in terms of which we wish in particular to construct the definition of truth for the first language" has to do with the definition of truth, not with Tarski's solution. That Leśniewski was at least implicitly at ease with the distinction does not imply that he himself employed a hierarchy of languages with distinct truth predicates. Quite the contrary. A major difference between the early and the mature Leśniewski is that in the former the language is semantically closed, while this is not the case with the object-language of the later systems, in which no semantic notions appear (and with this I do not intend to suggest in any way that a Tarskian hierarchy of languages is to be found in Leśniewski's mature thought). The need for a ban on self-reference like K is symptomatic of the universality of Leśniewski's early language. Consequently, since the language is universal, it contains its own, unique, truth-predicate.
PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com that is to say, the first seed of the later theory of semantic categories.
Leśniewski's conception in these early writings may be sketched like this: there are particular sciences as physics, geometry and so on, which treat different kinds of objects. The sentences of which (the language of) these sciences are composed contain names to denote their objects. There is a 'super-science' which is about all the objects in general, sentences included, metaphysics or ontology, and metaphysical sentences contain names for all the objects in general (recall that Leśniewski does not eschew multiple denotation). Logic is a science which is about only some objects, namely sentences, and the sentences of logic contain names for (in principle) all sentences of geometry, physics and so on, as well as for the sentences of metaphysics.
To a certain extent Leśniewski will retain also later this idea of the single sciences, 38 We can safely assume that among the things which Tarski was taught by
Leśniewski were at least the following: how to analyse quotation marks, the language/metalanguage distinction, the idea that truth is language-relative, the notion of a closed language, and that natural language is such a language, namely that natural language is universal. 43 These issues deserve much more than the few rough brush-strokes I am going to offer. The delicacy of the matter, however, chiefly due to the lack of textual first-hand sources, should not prevent that something be said at any rate: here below I limit myself to the first two points.
1. The analysis of quotation marks is among the elements which mark a definite distance between Leśniewski's early papers and Leśniewski's mature works. As we saw in the Critique, Leśniewski considered quotation marks as acceptable names of sentences and of other expressions, so that they are allowed in the 'definitions', the 'directives' and the 'conventions' he gives, like TL. In his later writings Leśniewski kept using quotation marks only informally and in ordinary language examples, without ascribing them any role in his logic. 44 Leśniewski's analysis of quotation marks is mainly known through Tarski, but it is in Kotarbiński that we find the first mention of it.
PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 'The sentence «p» is true, hence p', 'The sentence «p» is false, hence not-p', 'p, hence the sentence «p» is true', 'not-p, hence the sentence «p is false» is true'. And they refer to the fact that the variable 'p' appears only apparently twice in these formulas […] : once it occurs without quotation marks, once in quotation marks; but this is something different and here there is no closer connection than is between the word man which is the name of Jan, Piotr and others, and the inscription 'man', which is the name of each of the words consisting of those three letters in this order: m, a, n. 45 Therefore, '«p»' must be considered as a syntactically simple inscription: in the name of sentences '«p»' there is no variable 'p', even though quite the contrary seems to be the case. As Kotarbiński says in the note to this passage, the issue is also connected with Leśniewski's method of eliminating intensional functions which was mentioned in general terms by Tarski in 1923. 46 For something which Kotarbiński's passage points out very clearly is that TL was exposed to the same criticism by Leśniewski as the famous (5) The problem is not that quotation marks are 'intensional functors', however, but rather that "the entire expression '«p»' is an informal symbol for some name whose formal definition may not be quite the same from one context to another". 49 2. It has been remarked that although scholars have attributed the language/metalanguage distinction to Leśniewski, no one has quoted any source, textual or otherwise. 50 As a matter of fact we would seek in vain a clear statement in
Leśniewski's works stating literally that he introduced the distinction in the Polish philosophical milieu (let alone the term 'metalanguage'). 51 As previously remarked, in the Concept of Truth Tarski does not credit Leśniewski with the distinction.
He does so, however, in "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics". Although the passage is rather generic, it is significant: in Tarski's writings this is (seemingly) the only place where Leśniewski is said to be the first to give attention to the necessity of keeping language and metalanguage distinct and of relativizing semantic notions to language, as well as to the inadequacy of the 'monolinguistic' paradigm.
S. Leśniewski did this first over a dozen years [kilkanaście] ago with full exactness and strength. 52 As 'kilkanaście' means 'from thirteen to nineteen', the attribution is in agreement with the hypothesis that the metalanguage/language distinction was in the 1919/20
package. 53 This is confirmed by the German version of the paper, 54 and by Tarski's 1930 letter to Neurath. 55 We saw already in what sense we should look at Leśniewski's early writings for an outline of this distinction and how the point is connected with a strict formalization of the object-language. It suffices to consider, for instance, Leśniewski's 1929 paper on
Protothetic to see the distinction perfected and in full action, a fact which Carnap acknowledged in the Logische Syntax der Sprache. 56 PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
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A Leśniewskian formalized deductive system is a material collection of theses actually produced by someone and growing in space and time which begins with axioms, presupposing a theory of semantic categories (roughly a simple theory of linguistic types). The 'official' systems use a special symbolism of Leśniewski's own invention, which is generally considered the most precise ever formulated. The construction of such a system is carefully regulated by directives that must be formally stated. These regard the inscription of axioms, of definitions and of new theses in the system. 57 Directives do not belong to the object-language, but to the metalanguage:
Since directives do not themselves belong to the system of Protothetic which they affect, I usually formulated them in ordinary colloquial language. I comment on particular terms of ordinary language appearing in the directives in a series of terminological explanations, which are also formulated in ordinary language. 58 In order to save space, however, in this paper Leśniewski used a mereological metalanguage in Russell and Whitehead's symbolism for the directives and the terminological explanations. The language of the systems fulfills the expectation that Leśniewski had of the 'scientific language' of the early writings. Note that Leśniewskian systems are interpreted formal systems, in the sense that their language is a language in use, and their expressions are expressions with meaning. Despite the appearances, the path from the early writings to the mature logical systems is not one of rupture as one of progressive systematization, towards a complete separation of language and metalanguage.
The road from universality to its opposite required a formal sophistication which Leśniewski did not possess when he was struggling only with the weapons put at his disposal by Mill, Husserl and the other Brentanians. 59 This path, which passed through the removal from the object-language of names of the expressions actually occurring PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 'denote' and 'true' in the language of his first mereological system, which is already a far more regimented 'scientific language' than that of Leśniewski's previous works.
Quotation marks as adequate names of expressions and semantic notions still appear in the context of the object-language. For instance, we read Definition I. I use the expression 'ingredient of the object P' to denote the object P itself as well as each part of this object. 60 And Statement XXVII. The statement 'If P is an element of the set of the objects m, then P is m' is false.
Proof. Let us suppose that the statement XXVII is false. We infer from this that
(1) The statement 'if P is an element of a set of objects m, then P is m' is true. From statement (1) follows that (2) if P is an element of a set of objects m, then P is m. We can try to speak like this: a sentence of a certain system is true if and only if it is a thesis of that system. 70 Although this was for Tarski, in turn, no sufficiently intuitive answer to the problem, we can be reasonably certain that at the time it was more in accordance with In order to understand why for Leśniewski anticipating the definition of truth in Tarski's sense was no option, it is necessary that the gap which separates Tarski from Leśniewski in the entire conception of logic and semantics be properly understood.
The whole matter is, however, not an easy one, chiefly and again due to the scarcity of textual support. What we do know is that, from a certain period onwards, these two towering figures grew more and more apart, both personally and professionally. It seems that the reason for this is to be found in the context of the metalogical turn which took place in the Thirties. As Göran Sundholm has suggested, the contrast embodied by Leśniewski and Tarski has many similarities with Jean van PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com Heijenoort's opposition between logic as language and logic as calculus. 72 The construction of Tarski's dam on the Dnepr, and the circumstances under which the triumphant paradigm of logic as calculus made Leśniewskian logic appear to far too many an all too unmanageable, surpassed and superfluous tool, are a major issue in the history of logic. Thus, before a proper epilogue to the story of Tarski's dam and its Leśniewskian origins can be written, it will be necessary not only that its elements be disinterred in full detail, but also that a broader historical and cultural understanding of the matter be safely established.
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